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Abstract: The most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified 
only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. 
If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our 
results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by 
replacing  certain  outcomes  with  their  expected  utilities  for  each  individual,  so  that 
individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but 
neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied.  Both ex ante and ex post 
fairness can be satisfied but then the individual does not have well defined preferences 
over own lotteries. 
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1. Introduction 
If people have both a preference for fairness and continuous preferences, they are 
willing to make a small  sacrifice  for a  more egalitarian outcome. One way to create 
“fairness” in an ex ante sense is to flip a coin and reverse the roles.  The use of lotteries to 
allocate indivisible rewards and costs (such as the draft lottery) is evidence that ex ante 
fairness is often a concern. There is also considerable experimental evidence that agents 
care about ex ante fairness, see for example, Bolton et al. (2005), Krawcyck and le Lec 
(2006), Bolton and Ochenfels (2009) and Kircher et al. (2009). We show that there is a 
conflict between ex ante fairness and the independence axiom. In particular, we point out 
that five leading theories of outcome-based social preferences for fairness, those of Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfelds (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox and 
Sadirij (2004), and Andreoni and Miller (2002) all fail to reflect concerns for ex ante 
fairness when they are extended to lotteries using expected utility theory as is implicit in 
some of this work. 
One contribution of this paper is the formulation of very weak notions of ex ante 
fairness that are clearly  inconsistent with the  independence axiom.  Our results are a 
formalization and generalization of examples and results from the social choice literature, 
starting from the Diamond (1967) Machina (1989) example of a parent or social planner 
who strictly prefers to use a coin flip to allocate an indivisible good to two (other) agents 
and thus violates the axioms of Harsanyi (1955).  The social choice literature, which 
adopts  Harsanyi’s  “impartial-observer”  viewpoint,  has  responded  to  this  example  by 
relaxing independence in various ways.
1 The conflict between independence and ex ante 
fairness has also been noted in the behavioral literature, for example Kircher et al. (2009) 
give a verbal argument indicating that ex ante fairness is inconsistent with utilitarianism, 
and implicitly with the independence axiom.    
We  examine  formal  and  fairly  weak  implications  of  fairness,  using  only  the 
domain  of  “coin  flip”  lotteries,  namely  binary  lotteries  where  each  outcome  has 
                                                 
1For example Karni and Safra (2002) make use of only a partial version of independence in their study of 
the  use  of  lotteries  to  solve  indivisibility  problems.  Grant  et  al.  (2010)  also  recognize  this  when  they 
reconcile the Diamond paradox with Harsanyi’s social choice theory: they do so by means of a social   2 
probability 1/2.
2   We define “fairness for you” as a willingness to sacrifice my payoff for 
your  benefit and  “fairness  for  me”  as a willingness to reduce  your utility to achieve 
higher utility for me. Our first point is that if preferences satisfy either of these conditions 
then the independence axiom must be violated. As a consequence, if social preferences 
over deterministic allocations are extended to lotteries by treating the associated utility 
functions as expected utility, ex ante fairness is violated both for you and for me.   
We  also  show  that  if  preferences  over  lotteries  are  transitive  and  state-
independent, and the induced preferences over own lotteries are “individualistic” in the 
sense of not depending on other people’s consumption, then a weak  form of ex post 
fairness is necessarily violated. This is true, for example, for Fehr-Schmidt preferences 
extended to lotteries by replacing money income with expected money income. More 
generally, preferences that depend only on the expected value of individual utilities, such 
as those in Grant et al. (2010), may be ex ante fair, but cannot be ex post fair.  Moreover, 
the “obvious” extensions of standard models of fairness and social preference used in 
experimental research also fail to  incorporate both ex ante and ex post fairness, though 
there are however relatively straightforward variants of these models that do reflect both 
concerns; of course these variants necessarily violate the independence property  as well 
as  the  individualistic  risk  preference  property.  The  same  is  true  of  Borah’s  (2011) 
representation of preferences reflecting a trade-off between ex-ante and ex-post fairness.  
We conclude that experimental research on social preferences should pay more attention 
to preferences over lotteries, and that decision theorists should then consider what classes 
of tractable preferences are broadly consistent with the resulting data. 
2. Ex Ante Fairness for You and For Me 
There are two players who we refer to as “me” and “you.” We consider certain 
outcomes  2 ( , ) m y + ∈ ℜ  that can be interpreted as money for me and money for you. We 
also consider simple lotteries generated by tossing a fair coin with equal 50% probability 
                                                                                                                                            
welfare function that is a non-linear function of the expected utility of different individuals, and so violates 
the independence axiom 
2 Note that the domain we study does not allow preferences to depend on past actions, and that “fairness” 
here refers to fair allocations and not, for example, reciprocity.   3 
of  H(eads)  or  T(ails).  We  call  this  a  coin  flip  and  it  can  be  written  as 
2 2 (( , ),( , )) H H T T m y m y + + ∈ ℜ ×ℜ .   
We are interested in “my” preferences over certain outcomes and coin flips given 
as  a  complete  order  ≻
ɶ
  over  2 4
+ + ℜ ∪ ℜ ,  with  the  derived  strict  ordering  ≻  and 
indifference relation  ∼.
3  We develop several properties that such preferences  might 
have, and investigate their relationship with each other and with various forms of social 
preference in the literature. 
Property  1  [Independence]:  If  1 1 2 2 ( , ) ( , ) m y m y ≻
ɶ
  then  for  any  ( , ) H H m y   we  have 
1 1 2 2 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) H H H H m y m y m y m y ≻
ɶ
. 
Notice that since the role of the two certain prospects may be reversed, the same holds for 
the indifference relationship.  Any expected utility theory must satisfy Property 1, and 
some non-expected utility theories satisfy the axiom as well. It is weaker than the usual 
independence axiom, in the sense that it needs to hold only for fair coin flips; in 
particular since prospect theory models do not distort the probabilities {0,1/2,1} they 
satisfy this axiom.
4 On the other hand at an intuitive level it is clear that the property 
conflicts with the idea that people might prefer lotteries that are ex ante fair. 
  The most immediate conflict between the independence axiom and fairness comes 
from an ex ante version of fairness, so we start from that. Below we show there is also a 
contradiction between independence and ex post notions of fairness under the standard 
continuity assumption. 
To motivate our definition of ex ante fairness, suppose the agent weakly prefers 
(8,5)  to  the  more  egalitarian  (7,7),  and  strictly  prefer  the  fairer  coin-flip  lottery 
((1000,0),(7,7)) to the less fair ((1000,0),(8,5)). Such preferences satisfy the following 
condition, regardless of preferences over other lotteries. 
                                                 
3 It seems natural to assume that the order over certain outcomes is consistent with the order over coin 
flips, but we do not assume this as it is not required for our results.  
4  Herstein  and  Milnor  (1953)  derive  the  usual  independence  axiom  from  this  axiom  and  a  continuity 
assumption. If we replace weak preference with strict preference, this is what Machina (1989) refers to as 
“mixture separability.”   4 
Property  2  [Ex  Ante  Fairness  for  You]:  There  is  a  2 1 2 1 , y y m m > >
5  so  that 
1 2 2 1 ( , ) ( , ) m y m y ≺
ɶ
  and  an  2 1 , H H m m y y > <   such  that 
1 2 2 1 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) H H H H m y m y m y m y ≻ . 
This says that there is a sacrifice to make you better off that I would not make when 
comparing two deterministic outcomes, but I would make the sacrifice in the context of a 
coin flip if the other outcome is sufficiently less fair for you.
6 
 
It is easy to see that there are no preferences satisfying Properties 1 and 2, as Property 1 
requires that there are no lotteries for which the conditions in Property 2 hold.  
In particular our example of ex ante fairness violates the independence property. 
  Ex ante fairness for me is just the flip side of ex ante fairness for you.  
Property  3  [Ex  Ante  Fairness  for  Me]:  There  is  a  2 1 2 1 , y y m m > >   so  that 
1 2 2 1 ( , ) ( , ) m y m y ≻
∼   and  an  1 2 , H H m m y y < >   such  that 
2 1 1 2 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) H T H T m y m y m y m y ≻ . 
This says that there is an opportunity to enrich myself at your expense I would not take, 
but I am concerned about ex ante fairness for me in the sense that I would exploit it in the 
context of a coin flip if the other outcome is “sufficiently less fair” for me. 
As with Property 2, it is obvious that Property 3 conflicts with Property 1. 
 
3. Economic Models of Social Preference 
  We now discuss four different social preferences from the literature that reflect a 
concern for fairness.
7 Each of them describes choices under certainty. One method of 
                                                 
5 In this and the next property we use larger subscripts as a reminder of larger values. 
6 Suppose  2 1 1, 4, 2, 3 H H m y m y = = = = . Then the outcome  (2,3) may seem more fair than (1,4). 
However it might be “less fair” for you, even though it is farther from an equal division. Equal division is 
identified with fairness in many economic models, but in general depends on the units in which things are 
measured, and one can imagine situations where I think it is fair that you get four times as much as I do. 
Here we take the approach of being agnostic about what division is “fair.” However, we could add to 
Property 1 the restriction that  2 1 m y >   (to reflecting the notion that fairness means equal division) without 
any substantive change in our results. 
7  Cox et al. (2008) is somewhat related but considers axioms for “being more altruistic than” as opposed to 
preferences for fairness and does not consider the role of lotteries. 
 
   5 
extending them to uncertainty is to treat them as expected utility functions, and evaluate 
lotteries by their expected value; in this case Properties 2 and 3 must be violated. As we 
will see, alternative extensions to uncertainty, such as replacing lotteries over income 
with the expected value of income, run in to different problems. 
Fehr and Schmidt 
  The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) social preferences, in our notation, are given by 
( , ) max{ ,0} max{ ,0} U m y m y m m y α β = − − − −   with  0 β α ≤ < .  That  is,  if  you 
are getting more than me I dislike it, and if I am getting more than you, I also dislike that, 
although not as much as I dislike you getting more than me. Although Fehr and Schmidt 
do not explicitly say this, it is implicit from their discussion and analysis that this is an 
expected utility function, so the independence property (Property 1) is satisfied. Thus this 
version of their preferences fails both Property 2 and Property 3.  
  Now consider the alternative of extending the preferences by replacing income 
with expected  income.  We will show that  if  0 α β > ≥  that Properties 2 and 3 are 
satisfied, while of course the independence property is not.  Let   1 2 , 1, m y α α = = +  
and for any  γ  let  2 , m γβ = 1 ( 1) y γ β = − , so that  1 2 2 1 ( , ) ~ ( , ) m y m y  since both yield 
zero utility. Define  ( ) max( ,0) min( ,0) c x x x α β = + . Then 
1 2 2 1
1 1 2
1 2 2
( , ) 2 (( , ),( , )) 2 (( , ),( , ))
( )
( ( ( )))
( ) ( 1)
H H H H H H
H H H
H H H
H H H H
m y U m y m y U m y m y
m m c m m y y
m m c m m y y
c y m c y m α γβ γ
  ≡ −
= + − + − −
− + − + − +
= − + − − − − +
 
If   1
H H y m − < − , with  2 1 , H H m m y y > <  
 then 
 
( ) ( 1)
2
H H H H y m y m β γ β α γβ
α β γβ
  = − − − − + + −
= − −
 
For α β >  we can choose  ( )/2 γ α β β < −  so that  0   > , so Property 2 is satisfied. 
Notice if  0 β =  we have  0   >  for any  γ . Intuitively, since I care about fairness for 
me a coin flip that is unfair to you lets me ignore the fact that in the alternative outcome   6 
you get more than me. Notice that  2 1 m y >  and  1 2 m y <  so that even if we added these 
constraints to the property, it would still be satisfied by these Fehr-Schmidt preferences. 
  To  show  that  Property  3  is  satisfied  let  H H y m −   be  greater  than  β ,  with 
1 2 , H H m m y y < > . Then 
 
( ) ( 1)
( )
H H H H y m y m α γ α α γβ
γ α β
  = − − − − + + −
= − +
 
so  0   < . 
  Notice that the results concerning Properties 2 and 3 are not symmetric, and in 
particular Property 3 is satisfied even if  β α > . The reason for this is that the Fehr and 
Schmidt utility function does not treat you and me symmetrically so that “fairness to me” 
may be satisfied even if the agent is unconcerned about “fairness to you”. 
Bolton and Ockenfels 
  The  Bolton  and  Ockenfels  (2000)  preferences  are  given  by 
( , ) ( , /( )) U m y v m m m y = +  where v is twice differentiable, increasing and concave in 
the first argument, and concave with a maximum at ½ in the second argument.  
Here  my utility depends on  my share of the total as well as the amount of  money I 
receive. Notice that is closely related to a variation of Fehr and Schmidt preferences in 
which differences are measured relative to the total
8 
  ( , ) max{( )/( ),0} max{( )/( ),0} U m y m y m y m m y y m α β = − − + − − + . 
This differs from Bolton and Ockenfels only in that U  is not differentiable.
9 As is the 
case  with  Fehr  and  Schmidt  if  we  use  the  independence  axiom  to  extend  these 
preferences to uncertainty then Properties 2 and 3 are violated.  
Alternatively we can either use expected money income for both parties, or we 
can  use  expected  money  income  for  me  and  my  expected  share.  In  either  case  the 
independence property will  be violated. Indeed, under the assumptions of Bolton and 
                                                 
8 It is not clear that measuring money relative to the total is desirable since it is not clear what the base 
amounts are supposed to be. For example if the amounts are receipts in a laboratory experiment, they may 
sum to zero or even negative.  
9 There is a greater difference between these two preferences when applied to settings where the number of 
other people the agent cares about varies. Engelmann (2011) points out the pitfalls in extending these 
preferences to add a concern for total surplus.   7 
Ockenfels,  we  may  find  1 2 1 y y < <   so  that  1 2 (1,1/(1 )) (1,1/(1 )) v y v y + = + . 
Moreover, if  1 2 {1/(1 ),1/(1 )} s y y ∉ + +  then  1 (1, ) (1,1/(1 )) v s v y ≠ + . Independence 
then implies the coin flip between  1 (1, ) y  and  2 (1, ) y  must be indifferent to both of the 
outcomes of the coin flip. The utility of the coin flip is  (1, ) v s , and since neither the share 
of  expected  income  nor  the  expected  share  takes  on  the  values  
1 2 {1/ (1 ),1 / (1 )} y y + + , the coin flip is not indifferent two the certain outcomes. 
  Both the Fehr and Schmidt and the Bolton and Ockenfels preferences exhibit spite 
or egalitarianism in the sense that a Pareto inferior allocation may be preferred if it is 
fairer.  In  particular,  for  both  preferences,  my  utility  decreases  in  your  income  when 
y m > ,  while  when  y m <   my  utility  increases  in  your  income.  The  former  case 
implies a willingness for me to pay to reduce your income. This is one possible notion of 
fairness, but not one required in our properties. 
The remaining preferences we discuss are monotone and not egalitarian. 
Charness and Rabin   
  The  Charness  and  Rabin  (2002)  preferences  are  given  in  our  notation  by 
( , ) (1 ) ( min( , )) (1 )( )) U m y m m y m y γ γ δ δ = − + + − + ,  where  0 , 1 γ δ ≤ ≤ . That  is 
to say, they are a weighted average of my money income, the least income either of us 
have, and the social total. It is the dependence on the least income of either of us that 
gives  rise  to  a  concern  for  fairness.  Naturally  if  we  extend  these  preferences  to 
uncertainty using the independence axiom Properties 2 and 3 must fail. On the other hand 
the extension using expected money payoffs violate independence since  min( , ) Em Ey ɶ ɶ  
obviously does so. 
Cox and Sadiraj 
Cox and Sadiraj (2004) specify preferences that depend on who is getting more in 
a non-linear way.  In our notation, their preferences are given by 
  ( , ) (1 1( ) 1( )) ( 1( ) 1( )) U m y m y m y m m y m y y α α θ θ θ θ − + − + = − < − ≥ + < + ≥  
where  0 1,0 1,0 , 1 α θ θ θ θ θ + − + − + < < ≤ < ≤ ≤ ≤ − . The interpretation is that the 
weights on  , m y α α depend on how fair the allocation is. Because of decreasing marginal 
utility in  , m y , it is natural to interpret this as an expected utility function, in which case  
Properties 2 and 3 are  violated .   8 
Andreoni and Miller 
Andreoni  and  Miller  (2002)  consider  preferences  over  , m y   of  the  form  
[ ] ( , ) sgn( ) U m y m y α α α δ = + ,  1 α ≤ . As in the case of Cox and Sadiraj, it is difficult 
to interpret this other than as a Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function so Properties 
2 and 3 are violated.  Notice in the limiting Leontief case when  1 δ =  this model is a 
special case of Charness and Rabin.  
Andreoni and Miller preferences are a special case of preferences  ( , ) U m y  that are 
strictly concave and strictly increasing in both arguments. Since they reflect a concern for 
the welfare of the other player they are clearly altruistic. Assuming also symmetric utility 
for m  and  y  implies an equal division will always be preferred when 1-1 transfers are 
available. One interpretation is that this reflects a concern for fairness. Alternatively we 
could argue that concern for fairness must involve spite as is the case with Fehr and 
Schmidt or Bolton and Ochenfels – but this rules out many preferences such as those of 
Charness and Rabin that some might feel exhibit fairness.
10 In the case of lotteries a much 
clearer distinction can be drawn between altruism and fairness.  For example, consider 
Andreoni and Miller preferences  1/2 1/2 ( , ) U m y m y = + . One interpretation is that they 
exhibit concern for altruism and not fairness. Of course the expected utility extension 
does not exhibit ex ante fairness in the sense that it does not satisfy Properties 2 and 3. 
However the extension to lotteries defined by  1/2 1/2 ( , ) ( ) ( ) U m y Em Ey = + ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  does.
11 
4. Ex Post Fairness and Risk Preference 
  The models discussed in the previous section specify social preferences only over 
certain  outcomes  and  are  representable  by  means  of  a  utility  function.  If  we  extend 
preferences  to  lotteries  by  taking  the  expected  utility  the  independence  axiom  is 
necessarily satisfied, and so very weak notions of ex ante fairness for both you and me 
must fail. As we noted, an alternative procedure for extending preferences to lotteries is 
to replace certain income with its expected value. This allows for ex ante fairness, while 
                                                 
10 Yet a third interpretation of fairness might be that I care about the minimum of our two incomes as is the 
case with Fehr and Schmidt and Charness and Rabin. That rules out Andreoni and Miller preferences – yet 
Leontief preferences are a limiting case of their preferences. 
11 This is shown in footnote 12 below.   9 
the expected-utility extension does not. However, this method of relaxing independence 
does not allow for ex post fairness, and more broadly any preferences that have well 
defined risk preferences for me do not allow ex post fairness. 
In particular, consider  
Property  4  [Ex  Post  Fairness]:  There  exist  1 2 m m <   and  1 2 y y <   such  that 
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻ . 
This says that for some lottery the more egalitarian coin flip where we are both better off 
at the same time is preferred to the less egalitarian coin flip where our fates are opposite. 
For example, given a choice between (1,1,0,0) and (1,0,0,1) many people might prefer 
(1,1,0,0). This captures the common observation that “misery likes company” as well as 
ideas of status competition and relative consumption.
12 
  Taking, say, the Fehr-Schmidt preferences, and extending them to lotteries using 
expected income, allows for ex-post fairness but has the perhaps undesirable implication 
that agents are risk neutral; we next examine the extent to which a concern for ex post  
fairness is consistent with (a) well defined notions of preferences over lotteries that allow 
for risk aversion and (b) a concern for ex ante  fairness. 
Property 5 [Correlation Invariance]: If  1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻  then 
1 2 2 1 3 2 4 1 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻ . 
 
This property says that if we hold fixed the two possible outcomes for you, then my 
preferences over lotteries on my own consumption are independent of the states in which 
you receive each of the outcomes, so that my preferences ignore the correlation between 
my consumption and yours.  However, Property 5 does not require that preferences over 
my consumption are the same regardless of the level of your consumption, i.e. it allows 
for  preferences  such  as  ((3,1),(1,1)) ((1,1),(1,1)) ≻   and  ((3,0),(1,0)) ((1,0),(1,0)) ≺ . 
The following stronger condition rules this out and also implies Property 5: 
                                                 
12 Harel et al. (2005), Fleurbaey (2010), and Grant et al. (2010) consider notions of ex-post fairness for an 
outside  observer  in  settings  where  preferences  depend  only  on  the  expected  individual  utilities;    their 
conditions are assumed to hold at “many” lotteries as opposed to our condition which must hold at least 
one.   10
Property 5’ [Weakly Individualist Risk Preference]: If 
1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻  then for all  3 4 , y y , 
1 3 2 4 3 3 4 4 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻ . 
 
 
 
This property is satisfied by the utility representation obtained by Grant et al. (2010) for 
an impartial observer:  
  ( , ) ( ( )) ( ( )) m m y y U m y v Eu m v Eu y = + ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
where  m v  and  y v  are both continuous and increasing.  This utility function allows for a 
form of ex ante fairness, as when the  v’s  are concave, I am more willing to give you 
utility when I am better off. However, it is not consistent with a descriptive model of 
social preferences, as it rules out any concern for ex post fairness.   
  More  generally,  any  preferences  with  a  utility  representation  of  the  form 
( , ) ( ( ), ( )) m y U m y V Eu m Eu y = ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , with V  increasing in its first argument, satisfy Property 
5’: additive separability is not necessary. Even more generally any utility function of the 
form  ( , ) ( ( ), ) U m y W V m y = ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   where  V   is  scalar-valued  satisfies  this  property:  we 
conjecture that if Property 5’ is strengthened to hold on a wider domain along with the 
standard assumptions of continuity that give rise to a utility representation, then such a 
representation is always possible.  Conversely, when Property 5’ fails, an agent whose 
choices only alter the distribution of own outcome still needs to consider the allocations 
of others in making his decision. 
Notice,  moreover,  preferences  can  satisfy  both  Property  5’  (and  a  fortiori 
Property 5) and also ex ante fairness for both you and me, and in particular the Grant et 
al.  preferences  can  have  this  property.
13  In  addition,  if  the  Fehr  and  Schmidt  utility 
                                                 
13 This is true for example if individual utility functions are  ( ) , ( ) m y u m m u y y = = , with  m v  strictly 
increasing,  '( ) 0 m v M →  as M → ∞  and  y v  strictly increasing.  To see why Property 2 is satisfied, the 
assumptions guarantee the existence of an ( , ) (1,0) X Y ∼  with  1 X <  and  0 Y > . Consider the coin flips 
((1,0),( , 1) A M = − and B=(( , ),( , 1) X Y M − . Compute  ( ) (.5 .5 ) ( .5) m y U A v M v = + + − ,  
( ) (.5( )) (.5 .5) m y U B v M X v Y = + + − . Since  '( ) 0 m v M →  as M → ∞  also 
(.5 .5 ) (.5( )) 0 m m v M v M X + − + → . On the other hand while  (.5 .5) ( .5) 0 y y v Y v − − − > . Thus when 
M is large enough B is strictly preferred.  For Property 3, consider ( , ) (1,0) X Y ∼  with  1 X >  and  0 Y < .   11
function  is  extended  to  uncertainty  by  taking  the  expected  value  of  income,  then  it 
satisfies  Property  5’.  However,  under  a  very  mild  state-independence  condition,  any 
preferences that satisfy Property 5 violate ex-post fairness. Suppose the agent prefers 
((1,1),(0,0)) to ((1,0),(0,1)); then Property 5 implies the agent also prefers ((1,0),(0,1)) to 
((0,0),(1,1)) so that the agent cares about whether the high consumption occurs on H or T.  
Property 6 [State Independence]:  1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 (( , ),( , )) ~ (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y . 
Proposition: There are no transitive preferences satisfying Properties 4, 5 and 6. 
Proof:  By  Property  4,  let  1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻ .  Property  5  implies 
1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻ .  But  2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 (( , ),( , )) ~ (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y  
and  1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 (( , ),( , )) ~ (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y   by  Property  6.  We  conclude  that 
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 (( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , )) m y m y m y m y ≻ ,  which  contradicts  the  irreflexive  property  of 
strict preference. . 
￿ 
  Roughly  speaking  the  situation  is  this.  Given  preferences  for  fairness  under 
certainty  ( , ) U m y , their extension to lotteries by taking expected utility  ( , ) Eu m y ɶ ɶ  must 
violate ex ante fairness for both me and you. If instead we extend the preferences to 
lotteries  by  taking  the  expected  value  of  individual  income  ( , ) u Em Ey ɶ ɶ  or taking  the 
expected value of any function of individual income, we violate ex post fairness. We can 
view the former extension as exhibiting a preference for ex post fairness only and the 
second as exhibiting a preference for ex ante fairness only. By combining the two, we 
may easily get preferences for both ex post and ex ante fairness, though if Property 6 is 
satisfied Property 5 must be violated.  
Consider, for example, defining  ( , ) U m y  to be the Fehr and Schmidt functional 
form, and extend these to uncertainty using  ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) U m y EU m y U Em Ey γ γ ≡ + − ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ . 
(Notice  that  this  reduces  to  the  original  utility  function  for  deterministic  outcomes.)  
Recall  that  Properties  2  and  3  involve  strict  preference  and  we  already  showed 
( , ) U Em Ey ɶ ɶ  satisfies Properties 2 and 3  for  0 α > . It follows that for  γ  sufficiently 
                                                                                                                                            
Then as M → ∞  we again have  (.5 .5 ) (.5( )) 0 m m v M v M X + − + →  and now 
(.5 .5) ( .5) 0 y y v Y v − − − <  so A is strictly preferred. 
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small,  ( , ) U m y ɶ ɶ  must also satisfy Properties 2 and 3. Property 6 is obviously satisfied, so 
we shall show that Property 4 is satisfied even when  γ  is small. Consider in particular 
1 2 m m <  and  1 2 y y <  where  1 1 2 2 , m y m y = = . Then 
    ( )
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2
2 1
(( , ),( , )) (( , ),( , ))
( /2) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( /2)( )( ) 0
U m y m y U m y m y
U m m U m m U m m U m m
m m
γ
γ α β
−
= + − −
= + − >
 
so that Property 4 is indeed satisfied provided that  0 γ >  and  0 α > . 
  Borah (2011) provides an axiomatic characterization of a more complicated form 
of preferences that allow ex-ante and ex-post fairness: He proposes that the utility of a 
lottery  p on ( , ) m y  is the expected value of (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) y w m y w m p σ σ − +  where  σ  is a 
constant,  y p  is the marginal distribution of the lottery on  y ,  and  w   is a function on  
y M P ×  that need not be linear in  y p . 
5. Conclusion 
The independence axiom is inconsistent with even very weak notions of ex ante 
fairness.  Existing  models  of  fairness  do  not  focus  on  the  role  of  lotteries,  and  the 
preferences  analyzed  in  Fehr  and  Schmidt  (1999),  Bolton  and  Ockenfels  (2009), 
Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox and Sadiraj (2004) and Andreoni and Miller (2002) are 
defined for certain outcomes, without specifying how they are to be extended to lotteries. 
There are two issues this raises. First, it is not easy to distinguish fairness from altruism 
in the case of purely deterministic outcomes. Second, there are two obvious ways of 
extending preferences to lotteries.  
One way to extend preferences from certain outcomes to lotteries is the standard 
one of treating the certainty utility as a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. In 
this case the independence axiom is satisfied, but then ex ante fairness for both me and 
you  are  violated.  Alternatively  preferences  can  be  extended  by  replacing  the  certain 
individual  utility  with  its  expected  value,  in  which  case  the  independence  axiom  is 
violated. In the later case, for example, in the social welfare theory of Grant et al. (2010), 
not only is independence violated, but ex post fairness is ignored. Hence the standard 
models of fairness and social preference used in experimental research and their obvious 
extensions to lotteries do not incorporate both ex ante and ex post fairness. As we have   13
seen,  it  is  relatively  straightforward  to  construct  preferences  that  do  satisfy  both 
conditions, in part because we deliberately formulated very weak notions of fairness to 
make the impossibility results more sharp.  
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